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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-3704 
___________ 
 
JOSEPHINE M. TRIPODI, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
NORTH COVENTRY TOWNSHIP 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:12-cv-04156) 
District Judge:  Honorable Juan R. Sánchez 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 1, 2015 
 
Before:  GREENAWAY, JR., SCIRICA and RENDELL, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: October 6, 2015) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Josephine M. Tripodi appeals from the order of the District Court granting 
Defendant’s motion to dismiss her complaint.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm 
the judgment of the District Court.   
 Because we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the history and 
facts of the case, and because the District Court’s August 8, 2013 memorandum opinion 
contains a detailed account, we will recount the events in summary fashion.   
 Tripodi owns a residential rental property in North Coventry Township, 
Pennsylvania (“the Township”).  In 2007, the Township conducted an inspection of 
Tripodi’s property.  Upon inspection, the Township discovered multiple building and 
health code violations.  As a result, Tripodi was asked to remediate the code violations.  
In November 2007, after the violations persisted, the Township filed a civil action against 
Tripodi in the Chester County Court of Common Pleas.  In February 2008, the Township 
filed in that case a motion to enjoin all residential use of the property on grounds that the 
unabated code violations presented a risk to the safety of its residents.   
 In April 2008, the Common Pleas Court entered an order memorializing an 
agreement between the Township and Tripodi which established a schedule for her 
correction of the code violations.  After Tripodi failed to satisfy her obligations under that 
agreement, the Common Pleas Court entered an order holding Tripodi in contempt of 
court.  On August 26, 2009, following additional litigation in the case, the Common Pleas 
Court entered final judgment against Tripodi and ordered the sale of the property.   
 3 
 
 In July 2010, Tripodi filed an action in the District Court against the Township.1  
Counts I, II, III and VII of the complaint alleged violations under Pennsylvania state law.  
Counts IV, V, and VI were brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and allege violations of 
rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution.2  The Township filed a motion to 
dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  
Upon review, the District Court granted the motion.  This appeal followed.3 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over 
the District Court’s order dismissing Tripodi’s complaint.  Jones v. ABN Amro Mortg. 
Grp., Inc., 606 F.3d 119, 123 (3d Cir. 2010).  To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, 
to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  A plaintiff 
                                              
1 As the District Court noted, although the Common Pleas Court entered final judgment 
permitting Tripodi’s property to be sold, a sale has not yet occurred. 
 
2 The complaint presented state law claims for: inverse condemnation (Count I), slander 
of title (Count II), abuse of process (Count III), and intentional interference with 
contractual relations (Count VII).  The complaint also alleged that the Township deprived 
Tripodi of her rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count IV) and committed an unlawful 
taking in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments (Counts V and VI). 
 
3 We note that Tripodi was represented by counsel in proceedings before the District 
Court.  Although Tripodi’s attorney continued to represent her during the earlier stages of 
this appeal (including the time when the parties engaged in mediation), counsel withdrew 
her representation shortly after she filed an opening brief.  Tripodi now proceeds pro se 
and asks us to strike the Township’s brief.  The Township in turn moves us to quash 
Tripodi’s reply brief. 
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must plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Id.  We may affirm the judgment of the 
District Court on any basis supported by the record.  See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 
246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
 Count IV alleged generally that the Township deprived Tripodi of her “civil 
rights” under § 1983 by refusing to consider the repairs and improvements that she has 
made to her property.  A “local government may be sued under § 1983 only for acts 
implementing an official policy, practice or custom.”  Losch v. Borough of Parkesburg, 
Pa., 736 F.2d 903, 910 (3d Cir. 1984) (citing Monell v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 
436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978)).  “Thus, municipal liability attaches only when ‘execution 
of a government’s policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury.’”  Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 
F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). 
 Even assuming that Tripodi adequately alleged an underlying constitutional 
violation, we agree with the District Court that she failed to set forth facts from which the 
Court could infer that the Township violated her rights while acting pursuant to a policy, 
practice or custom.  Indeed, Tripodi failed to plead any facts whatsoever in her complaint 
suggesting that the Township was liable to her under the principles set forth in Monell.  
In Tripodi’s response to the Township’s motion to dismiss, she claimed that the 
Township’s decision to “pursue[] a course of taking the subject property regardless of 
                                                                                                                                                  
  
 5 
 
whether [she] brought it into compliance” constituted a policy or custom.  We conclude, 
however, that such a conclusory statement fails to adequately allege that the Township 
has adopted and maintained a policy, custom, or practice that resulted in a violation of 
Tripodi’s constitutional rights.  See Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 637 (3d 
Cir. 1995) (determining that vague assertions of a policy are not sufficient to impose 
liability under Monell); cf. Abbott v. Latshaw, 164 F.3d 141, 148 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(explaining that a complaint must set forth more than “conclusory allegations of 
concerted action”).  As a result, the claim was properly dismissed.4 
 The District Court also correctly dismissed Counts V and VI of the complaint, 
which alleged that Tripodi’s property has been taken “without just compensation” for the 
public’s use in the “Pottstown Gateway Project,” the precise nature of which she failed to 
explain.  Although the Fifth Amendment prohibits the taking of private property for 
public use without just compensation, a plaintiff aggrieved by the enforcement of a 
municipal zoning ordinance must exhaust all pertinent state procedures before asserting a 
federal takings claim.  See Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank 
of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 195 (1985) (“[I]f a State provides an adequate procedure 
for seeking just compensation, the property owner cannot claim a violation of the Just 
Compensation Clause until it has used the procedure and been denied just 
compensation.”).  Tripodi has admittedly not pursued an action through Pennsylvania’s 
                                              
4 Because we affirm the dismissal of Tripodi’s claim on these grounds, we need not 
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Eminent Domain Code (or otherwise through the state courts); as a consequence, her 
claim is not ripe for federal review.5   
 Having dismissed Tripodi’s federal claims, the District Court acted within its 
discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state-law claims.  
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Figueroa v. Buccaneer Hotel Inc., 188 F.3d 172, 181 (3d Cir. 
1999).6   
 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.7 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
consider any of the District Court’s additional bases for dismissal. 
5 Tripodi does not set forth any valid reasons in her brief why Pennsylvania’s inverse 
condemnation procedures would be foreclosed to her. 
6 Additionally, we determine that the District Court did not err in dismissing Tripodi’s 
complaint without providing leave to amend.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 
293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that leave to amend should be afforded unless 
it would be inequitable or futile).  We agree that it would have been futile for Tripodi to 
amend her Monell claim; she has given no indication that she can plead anything beyond 
the conclusory statements that she presented in her response to the motion to dismiss.  
Indeed, she does not provide any further clarification of her claim in her appellate filings.  
Likewise, Tripodi does not suggest on appeal that she has now availed herself of 
Pennsylvania’s procedures for obtaining compensation such that she can now state a 
federal takings claim. 
  
7 The Township’s motion to quash Tripodi’s reply brief, and Tripodi’s motion to strike 
the Township’s appellate brief, are denied. 
